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COMBATING STRUCTURAL BIAS IN DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGNS THAT USE ARBITRATION: 
TRANSPARENCY, THE UNIVERSAL SANITIZER 
By  
Lisa Blomgren Amsler* 
 
Employers and businesses adopt adhesive arbitration clauses as a means to 
manage the risk of litigation and perceived “runaway” jury awards. 1  Mandatory or 
adhesive arbitration describes the power of an economically stronger repeat player to 
impose an adhesive binding arbitration clause on the weaker, usually one-shot, player. 
Such agreements appear frequently as a condition of some economic relationship, most 
problematically employment, consumer purchases, or health care.
2
 It is such a powerful 
tool for corporations to manage risk that they are building it into job application forms, 
personnel manuals, form contracts for employment, and the fine print of consumer 
contracts and warranties in the United States. Corporations have such vast economic 
power, and have so consolidated that power through mergers and acquisitions, that 
employees and consumers are generally unable to evade the arbitration clauses. These 
stick to them like the alien parasite that looked like a plastic pizza on Mr. Spock’s back in 
an episode of Star Trek.
3
  Employees and consumers may choose to refuse to enter into 
the economic relationship by refusing employment or seeking to purchase goods and 
services from other sources. However, this requires educating them about what to most 
Americans is an arcane area of law, and the consolidation is such that, in reality, these 
choices are few. 
In this brave new world, how can we combat structural bias built into dispute 
system designs (“DSDs”) that include mandatory or adhesive arbitration clauses? This 
essay will explore transparency and disclosure as means to that end. First, it will discuss 
                                                        
* Lisa Blomgren Amsler (formerly Bingham) is the Keller-Runden Professor of Public Service at Indiana 
University’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Bloomington, Indiana. 
 
1
 Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 221–23 (arguing that repeat players that control the design 
of arbitration systems manage risk by shifting transaction costs to the one-shot player to reduce the 
settlement value of a case and discourage litigation). 
 
2
 For a review of the literature, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public 
Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of 
Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 985 (2012); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third 
Arbitration Trilogy, Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 324 (2011). 
 
3
 Episode Number 29 at the end of Star Trek’s first season was entitled “Operation: Annihilate.” According 
to the Internet Movie Database, the plot line is:  
The Enterprise traces a virus-like outbreak that seems to be traveling in a direct 
line across a planetary system. The next planet is home to Kirk's brother Sam, 
his sister-in-law and their young son. The Enterprise arrives too late however for 
Sam. They find flying jellyfish-like creatures that attach themselves to humans. 
They take over the victims’ nervous system forcing them to bend to their will. 
Spock finds a weapon to use against the creatures but it leaves him hopelessly 
blind. 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0708441/ (last accessed June 21, 2014).  
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institutional analysis and DSD to examine indicia of structural bias. Second, it will rely 
on other excellent scholarship to review the current state of the law and instead focus on 
the relative lack of remedies available to employees and consumers from the courts, 
Congress, or the executive branch. Third, it examines scholarly proposals to address the 
gap in remedies. Finally, it explores the various ways employees and consumers might 
engage in self-help to promote transparency as a means to accountability for biased 
arbitration systems. 
 
I. Exploring Structural Bias in Arbitration Systems 
Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom made major contributions to our understanding of 
human institutions.
4
 Her work, and the ‘Indiana School’s’ Institutional Analysis and 
Development (“IAD”) Framework, developed at Indiana University’s Workshop on 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis, provide a grammar and syntax to examine wide 
institutional diversity and how institutions govern our collective behavior.
5 
 The field of 
DSD developed independently as an application of industrial relations concepts to 
broader practice, yet it can be better understood through the lens of Ostrom’s framework. 
 
A. Institutional Analysis and Development 
In the IAD framework, Ostrom identified an underlying set of universal building 
blocks for researching institutions and how they function arranged in layers.
6
 Most often, 
this framework will help researchers focus on the simplest unit of analysis — the action 
situation.
7
 Researchers analyze the situation, decide what assumptions to make about 
participants, predict outcomes, and test the predictions empirically.
8
 However, if the data 
do not support the predictions, it may be necessary to examine the deeper layers within 
which the action situation is embedded. For example, structures are nested; families, 
firms, communities, industries, states, nations, transnational alliances, and others are all 
                                                        
4
 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge University Press 1990). Portions of this discussion first appeared in Lisa 
Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing Conflict, 24 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 2-26 (2008-9). 
 
5
 See generally ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (Princeton University Press 
2005). The study of institutional design is the subject of literature in political science, economics, 
sociology, public affairs, and policy analysis. 
 
6
 Id. at 6. Ostrom defines a framework as the level of analysis necessary to identify the elements and 
relationships among those elements necessary to engage in institutional analysis, and which provides the 
most general set of variables that therefore should apply to all settings and institutions. Id. at 28. 
 
7
 Ostrom focuses on two holons in the action arena, which is defined as a unit of analysis in which 
participants (first holon) and the action situation (second holon) interact in ways affected by other outside 
variables and produce outcomes. Ostrom, supra note 2, at 13.  
 
8
 Id. at 7.  
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structures that can be viewed in isolation or as part of a larger whole.
9
 Ostom borrowed 
from complex adaptive systems literature the concept of the holons — "nested 
subassemblies of part-whole units.”10 To apply this concept to DSD, one might consider a 
court-connected mediation program as a holon nested within the structure of the court, 
which is nested in the judicial branch, which in turn is nested within the structure of the 
state or federal government.  
To analyze an action situation, Ostrom uses seven categories of information:  
 
(1) the set of participants [single individuals or corporate actors], 
(2) the positions to be filled by participants, (3) the potential 
outcomes, (4) the set of allowable actions and the function that 
maps actions into realized outcomes [action-outcome linkages], (5) 
the control that an individual has in regards to this function, (6) the 
information available to participants about actions and outcomes 
and their linkages, and (7) costs and benefits – which serve as 
incentives and deterrents – assigned to actions and outcomes.11 
 
These are the common structural components that represent the building blocks for all 
institutions at their most general level.  
One can readily see how we might use these categories of information to 
understand DSD. As an example of allowable actions, a mediation DSD affords more 
control over the outcome of the function of dispute resolution than an arbitration design, 
because the mediator has no power to decide a case. On the other hand, as an example of 
information availability, limited discovery in a DSD might afford participants 
significantly less information about actions and outcomes and their linkages.  
Once a researcher understands the initial action arena, she will seek to understand 
the outside variables that are affecting it;
12 
this is a two-stage process. First, the action 
arena now becomes a dependent variable subject to three categories of exogenous 
variables: “(1) the rules used by participants to order their relationships, (2) the attributes 
of the biophysical world that are acted upon in these arenas, and (3) the structure of the 
more general community within which any particular arena is placed.”13 In the second 
stage of the analysis, the researcher will examine linkages between one action arena and 
others; either in sequence or at the same time.
14  
For example, in DSD, parties in 
                                                        
9
 Id. at 11.  
 
10
 Id.  
 
11
 Id. at 32. See generally Chapter 2, at 32-68. Ostrom explains how to operationalize these concepts using 
game theory to structure experiments in a laboratory in Chapter 3, at 69-98. 
 
12
 Id. at 15. 
 
13
 Id. (emphasis in original). Lawyers focus on the rules, but for the strategic purpose of advancing the 
interests of their clients and as agents of participants in the action arena of the arbitration, administrative 
agency, court, or other forum.  
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mediation negotiate in the shadow of the civil justice system; the trial is an action arena 
that follows in sequence upon a failed civil or commercial mediation.  
As lawyers, we tend to focus more on the rules than on the other two categories of 
variables.
15 Ostrom’s discussion of rules is central to understanding DSD. She defines 
rules for the purpose of Institutional Analysis and Development as “shared 
understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or 
outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted.”16 She describes how rules can emerge 
through processes of democratic governance, or through groups of people who organize 
privately, such as corporations or membership associations, or within a family or work 
team.
17
 Rules can evolve as working rules that are a function of what individuals decide 
to do in practice. In other words, her concept of rules would encompass rules in DSD 
structures that governments create, those that parties mutually negotiate, and those that 
one corporate player imposes on a weaker party in an economic transaction. 
Moreover, institutional analysis is aimed at all institutions — both those within an 
open, democratic society governed by the rule of law and also those in other systems 
where rules and attempts to enforce them exist, but people generally try to get away with 
noncompliance.
18
 Rules are also formulated in language, an imperfect and sometimes 
ambiguous tool, and hence they depend upon a generally shared understanding of 
meaning by humans who interpret and apply them in action situations. Thus, rules may or 
may not be predictable and may or may not produce stability in human action. 
Compliance with rules is a function of monitoring and enforcement.
19
  
 
B. Dispute System Design 
As a field, DSD is best understood as applied institutional design, or institutional 
design in practice. First, this section will sketch the evolution of DSD as a field. Second, 
it presents evolving catalogue of structural variables that researchers have used to 
compare designs in the field of alternative or appropriate dispute resolution (“ADR”). 
Third, it briefly describes the problem of control over DSD, which is a key factor in 
arbitration DSDs that contain structural bias. We can use institutional analysis to deepen 
our understanding of structural bias in DSD. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
14
 Id. 
 
15
 Ostrom also reports that her book focuses primarily on rules, which are of central interest to political 
science and policy analysts, of which she counts herself one. Id. at 29. 
 
16
 Id. at 18 (citations omitted). This is a "rule" in the sense of a regulation adopted by an authority. She 
describes three other possible definitions of rules from the literature of social science; specifically rules as 
instructions for successful strategies, or rules as precepts such as the Golden Rule, or rules as principles that 
can be true or false, such as the laws of physics. 
 
17
 Id. at 19. 
 
18
 Id. at 20. She describes this as rules-in-form being consistent, or inconsistent, with rules-in-practice. 
 
19
 Id. at 21. 
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DSD first emerged as a field in organizational conflict and workplace disputes. 
Historically, organizations reacted to conflict rather than planned how to manage it; they 
used existing administrative or judicial forums to address it.
20  
Changes in the social 
contract and the rise and fall of unionism led to the concept of DSD, a term coined by 
Professors William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen Goldberg to describe the purposeful 
creation of an ADR program in an organization to manage conflict through a series of 
steps or options for process.
21 
They argued that dispute resolution processes can focus on 
interests, rights, or power,
22 
but that organizational conflict management systems will 
function better for the stakeholders if they focus primarily on interests. A healthy system 
should only use rights-based approaches (arbitration or litigation) as a fallback when 
disputants reached impasse; parties should not generally resort to power. Organizational 
DSDs can take a myriad of forms, including a multi-step procedure culminating in 
mediation and/or arbitration, ombudspersons
23 
programs giving disputants many different 
process choices,
24
 or simply a single step binding arbitration design. The field of dispute 
resolution broadly adapted the concept of DSD beyond organizations with employment 
conflict and courts to other legal and administrative contexts. 
Elements of DSD include choices that create rules which become structures. 
Ostrom’s framework can help identify the elements of DSD. Court-annexed and stand-
alone ADR programs contain many distinct structural variables and/or choices that 
together form a DSD. These include, but are not limited to:
25
 
 
1. The sector or setting for the program (public, private, or 
nonprofit); 
2. The overall dispute system design (integrated conflict 
management system, silo or stovepipe program, ombuds 
program, outside contractor); 
3. The subject matter of the conflicts, disputes, or cases over 
which the system has jurisdiction; 
4. The participants eligible or required to use the system;  
                                                        
20
 DAVID B. LIPSKY, ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM 
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANGERS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 6 (Jossey-Bass Inc. 
2003). They also observe that DSD may serve as a union avoidance strategy. 
 
21
 WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COST OF 
CONFLICT 41–64 (1988). 
 
22
 Id. at 3–19. Recent experimental work empirically supports the emphasis on interests in DSD. See Jean 
Poitras & Aurelia Le Tareau, Dispute Resolution Patterns and Organizational Dispute States, 19 INT’L J. 
CONFLICT MGMT. 72, 84 (2008).  
 
23
 Mary P. Rowe, The Ombudsperson’s Role in a Dispute Resolution System, 7 NEGOT. J. 353 (1991).  
 
24
 See generally, CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (Jossey-
Bass 1996).  
 
25
 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Managing 
Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 12-14 (2008-2009). 
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5. The timing of the intervention (before the complaint is filed, 
immediately thereafter, after discovery or information 
gathering is complete, and on the eve of an administrative 
hearing or trial); 
6. Whether the intervention is voluntary, opt out, or mandatory; 
7. The nature of the intervention (training, facilitation, consensus-
building, negotiated rulemaking, mediation, early neutral 
assessment or evaluation, summary jury trial, non-binding 
arbitration, binding arbitration) and its possible outcomes; 
8. The sequence of interventions, if more than one; 
9. Within intervention, the model of practice (if mediation, 
evaluative, facilitative or transformative; if arbitration, rights or 
interests, last-best offer, issue-by-issue or package, high-low, 
etc.); 
10. The nature, training, qualifications, and demographics of the 
neutrals; 
11. Who pays for the neutrals and the nature of their financial or 
professional incentive structure; 
12. Who pays for the costs of administration, filing fees, hearing 
fees, hearing space; 
13. The nature of any due process protections (right to counsel, 
discovery, location of process, availability of class actions, 
availability of written opinion or decision); 
14. Structural support and institutionalization with respect to 
conflict management programs or efforts to implement; and 
15. Control that disputants have as to process, outcome, and DSD. 
Is it both parties together, one party unilaterally, or a third 
party for them?
26
 
                                                        
26
 The National Employment Arbitration Roundtable revised this list:  
Structural Features 
1. Location 
2. Who initiates, how and when 
3. Who chooses neutral 
4. Notice  
5. Information exchange/discovery 
6. Formality, character of proceeding 
7. Availability of aggregate claims 
8. Decision standard 
9. Available remedies and form of award 
10. Access to counsel 
11. Opportunity for access to other processes, appeal 
Context 
12. Type of employment dispute 
13. Sector or setting (public, private, non-profit, hybrid) 
14. Participants eligible or required to use 
Administration of System 
15. Stakeholder participation in design and redesign 
16. Selection and characteristics of pool of neutrals 
17. Payment of neutrals, administrative costs 
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Each is a structural element of the DSD that must be embodied in a contract, policy, 
guideline, regulation, statute, or other form of rule. 
Ostrom argues that there are three related concepts: strategies, norms and rules: 
“[I]ndividuals adopt strategies in light of the norms they hold and within the rules of the 
situation within which they are interacting.”27 Even when we limit our use of rules to 
regulation or prescription subject to enforcement, there are nevertheless many types of 
rules.
28 
Arguing that we need to use simplified, broad, and general types or classes of 
rules to accumulate comparable research and advance the field of institutional design, 
Ostrom proposes seven kinds of rules: rules regarding positions, boundaries, choice, 
aggregation, information, payoff, and scope.
29 
 
Applying Ostrom’s categories to arbitration, who is eligible to use arbitration is a 
position rule that defines the category of participants. What kinds of cases arbitration will 
cover is a boundary rule that defines the scope of the arbitrator’s power. Whether 
arbitration is voluntary, mandatory, or opt out is a choice rule because it defines what 
action or action set a participant/position has in relation to arbitration. Rules that limit the 
use of class actions in arbitration are aggregation rules that shape whether it is an 
affordable remedy. They interact with boundary rules to make individual pursuit of a 
claim in arbitration unaffordable and nullify public laws for fair credit or consumer 
protection. 
DSDs that limit discovery have rules about what information participants can use 
in the DSD to persuade the arbitrator. DSDs can also limit the award or outcome of 
arbitration by shifting attorneys’ fees or arbitrator fees to the winner or loser; these are 
examples of payoff rules. 
If we more systematically analyze and compare the implicit rule choices in 
arbitration DSDs, we can better understand the differences in outcomes. Rules define 
substantive rights in the system. The collective bargaining agreement’s requirement for 
just cause for discipline is a choice rule in Ostrom’s framework; it affects the assignment 
of particular action sets to positions. Under a just cause rule, the position of employer is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
18. Mechanism for assessment, evaluation 
Nancy Welsh, Thomas Stipanowich, Lisa Blomgren Bingham, and David Lipsky, Materials from National 
Employment Arbitration Roundtable (2012) (on file with author). 
 
27
 Ostrom, supra note 5, at 175. 
 
28
 Id. at 18. See generally id. at 186–215 for a description of different kinds of rules. 
 
29
 Id. at 190. Ostrom provides very general definitions:  
Position rules create positions (e.g. member of a legislature or a committee, 
voter, etc.). Boundary rules affect how individuals are assigned to or leave 
positions and how one situation is linked to other situations. Choice rules affect 
the assignment of particular action sets to positions. Aggregation rules affect the 
level of control that individual participants exercise at a linkage within or across 
situations. Information rules affect the level of information available in a 
situation about actions and the link between actions and outcome linkages. 
Payoff rules affect the benefits and costs assigned to outcomes given the actions 
chosen. Scope rules affect which outcomes must, must not, or may be affected 
within a domain.   
Id. 
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no longer free to fire an employee at will, with or without cause, for no reason or any 
reason except those prohibited by law.
30
 The employer has the burden of proving just 
cause for discipline, including notice, consistency in discipline, progressive discipline, 
and other elements. In the absence of a union, an employer can incorporate an at will 
employment decision standard into the arbitration design; this choice rule shifts the 
burden of proof to the employee from the employer as is the tradition in labor relations in 
a discipline case. To identify structural bias in an arbitration DSD, we need to compare 
these designs meaningfully and systematically through a careful study of the forms that 
Ostrom’s various rules take.   
Ostrom conducted research on institutions for managing conflict over common 
pool resources in environmental and other settings.
31
 She characterized robust institutions 
as ones that persist, are stable, and adapt to changing circumstances.
32
 Their designs 
include clearly defined boundaries of the resource, clearly defined rights of individuals 
who can take it, proportional equivalence between benefits and costs, collective choice 
arrangements, monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict resolution mechanisms, minimal 
recognition of rights to organize, and enterprises in which appropriation, enforcement, 
monitoring, conflict resolution, and governance are nested in layers. Arbitration DSDs as 
institutions generally are subject to this set of principles, particularly collective choice 
arrangements, minimal recognition of the rights to organize, monitoring, and governance.  
However, most of these are lacking in adhesive or mandatory arbitration DSDs. 
Collective choice arrangements are those in which people who are subject to the rules are 
included in the group who can make or change the rules.
33 
 Functionally, this is control 
over DSD.
34
 Dispute systems vary across two separate dimensions of disputant control: 
control over the full DSD, or control within a given case using a specific process 
provided by that design. Control over DSD includes the power to make choices regarding 
the rules that create the design: for example, what cases, which process or sequence of 
processes, what due process rules, what discovery, and other structural aspects. Within a 
DSD, control over a given case can address process and/or outcome. In arbitration, one or 
more parties may give control over outcome to a third party to issue a binding decision. 
                                                        
30
 Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate over Employment At-
Will: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 145 (1992) (“Control over employment 
termination is a major determinant of workplace power.  The debate over employment at-will focuses on 
the appropriate approach to the legal regulation of this power.”). 
 
31
 Ostrom, supra note 5, at 258–80 
 
32
 She first described these in Ostrom, supra note 4. 
 
33
 Ostrom, supra note 5, at 259. 
 
34
 Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004) (arguing that control over dispute system design shifts the settlement value 
of cases in commercial mandatory arbitration); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System 
Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002) (arguing that control over dispute 
system design changes outcomes in employment arbitration); Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let’s Find 
Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002(1) J. OF DISP. RESOL. 101-126 (2002) 
(arguing that control over dispute system design makes a difference in mediation outcomes). 
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 Structural bias in DSDs may depend on: (1) who is designing the system; (2) what 
their goals are, and (3) how they have exercised their power. DSDs generally fall into one 
of three categories: (1) a court, agency, or other third party designs it for the benefit of 
disputants (third party design); (2) two or more disputants subject to the system jointly 
design it (all disputants or parties design); and (3) a single disputant with stronger 
economic power designs it and imposes it on the other disputant (one party design).
35
 
 For example, historically, the public civil justice system is the product of design 
by a third party: the judicial branch with funding from the legislative branch acting for 
the benefit of disputants.
36
 These represent collective choice rules under a constitutional 
form of government in which voters elect legislators who provide appropriations for the 
judicial branch; the judicial branch acts under power from the collectively chosen 
constitution. There are at least minimal rights to organize in that court-connected DSDs 
allow people to have the representation or legal counsel of their choice, if they can afford 
it. Public interest litigants can participate. Moreover, there is monitoring in that 
government tracks and regulates its judicial and public agency systems.  
 Historically, private justice systems arose in the shadow of the public justice 
system, specifically, the courts and administrative agencies that are third party DSDs. For 
example, both or all parties negotiated DSD in their labor relations or commercial 
contracts. Labor relations DSDs entail their own collective choice rules in that national 
labor law provides a legal framework that allows for employees to form, join, and assist 
unions and act collectively. Participants have the right to self-organize. These collective 
action entities are nested within a constitutional government that provides through other 
collective choice rules a legal framework in labor law that enforces their agreements.
37 
There is transparency through the union’s right to information under labor law that allows 
collectively organized employees to monitor the results of their DSD over time; this is an 
information rule. Moreover, the disputants themselves can determine whether the costs 
and benefits of their system are in balance in that they can change their standing 
arbitrator panel, or their third party service provider, or determine to adopt a rule that 
shifts arbitrator fees to the losing party, which is a payoff rule in Ostrom’s categories. 
Another example of private justice systems with collective choice are in the 
diamond
38
 and cotton
39
 industries. These were robust in Ostrom’s sense; they were 
enduring, stable, adaptive, participatory, characterized by collective choice rules. Both 
the diamond and cotton industries use a private democratic membership structure, subject 
                                                        
35
 Id. 
 
36
 For publications evaluating ADR programs in a variety of federal courts, see the website of the Federal 
Judicial Center, available at http://www.fjc.gov (last visited June 21, 2014). 
 
37
 PATRICK HARDIN, JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., CHRISTOPHER T. HEXTER, JOHN T. NEIGHBOURS (eds.), THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT (5
th
 Ed. 
2006).  
 
38
 Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992). 
 
39
 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
 41 
 
to monitoring by that membership association, which is self-governing. Their 
membership both chose the design, adopted through their associations’ constitutions and 
bylaws, and participated in the design either as disputants or decision-makers or 
arbitrators in their own private justice systems. 
 However, in adhesive arbitration, there is no collective choice; generally a single 
disputant with superior economic power has taken unilateral control over designing a 
dispute system for conflicts to which it is a party. Moreover, they impose DSDs that 
effectively restrict recourse to the public civil justice system through adhesive binding 
arbitration clauses.
40 
These DSDs do not have meaningful collective choice rules within 
the holon that is the arbitration program.
41 
They are nested in a legal framework for 
arbitration in interstate commerce, specifically, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),42 
which was adopted through collective choice rules in a constitutional form of 
government, namely our democracy. However, an individual’s personal participation in 
collective choice at the level of national government is limited, and the FAA was enacted 
in 1925 before most people now alive were born.  
There are limited or no rights to self-organization in the context of adhesive 
arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that plans may preclude class action 
litigation or class arbitration.
43
 Some plans prohibit the use of legal counsel, which might 
otherwise be considered a form of self-organization or freedom of association.
44
 Ostrom’s 
                                                        
40
 Scott Baker, A Risk-Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 OR. L. REV. 861 (2004) (arguing that 
some employers use mandatory arbitration to manage risk, and that repeat players should pay more for the 
privilege); see also Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and the 
Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 375 (2003) (finding that rising 
individual rights litigation and increased judicial deferral to nonunion arbitration are institutional factors 
leading to increased adoption of mandatory arbitration in the workplace); Alexander J.S. Colvin, From 
Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of Workplace Dispute 
Resolution, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 581 (2004); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of 
Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2005) (arguing that risks of compelled ADR include the 
“likelihood that adhesion contract drafters will use arbitration clauses and related requirements to short-
circuit existing legislation with newly drafted provisions protective of their special interests, that contract 
drafters will, in some cases, go even further and use their drafting power to squelch all claims, and that 
ADR providers will be sorely tempted to cast their lot with adhesion contract drafters in order to win and 
retain valuable business”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631 (2005) (surveying the emergence of mandatory arbitration in lieu of civil litigation for 
employment and consumer claims and concluding that it is unjust). 
 
41
 In theory, there is consent to form contracts or adhesive arbitration clauses in personnel manuals because 
the prospective consumer or employee can walk away. However, as growing numbers of service providers 
and employers adopt these practices, there are no meaningful alternatives. Linda J. Demaine and Deborah 
R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's 
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004). 
 
42
 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (2012) (enacted in 1925). 
 
43
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011). 
 
44
 See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (holding that there is no first 
amendment right to freedom of association with legal counsel within an administrative proceeding 
established to support veterans seeking benefits for injuries). 
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categories are helpful in gaining clarity about the rules that establish adhesive arbitration 
designs. 
 
C. Transparency and Research on Structural Bias in Arbitration DSDs 
 The Supreme Court has enforced adhesive arbitration on the theory that it is a 
mere substitution of forum, not a change in the substance of the remedy.
45
 There are good 
reasons to believe this may not be true. Arbitration outcomes may differ systematically 
from litigation outcomes. Rigorous empirical research might answer this question. 
However, there are obstacles to that research due to rules that establish arbitration’s 
confidentiality and the limited information about arbitration DSDs. These obstacles 
operate as barriers to controlling structural bias and improving arbitration. 
There is limited transparency in adhesive arbitration because awards generally are 
confidential unless the parties mutually agree to their publication.
46 
Even where states 
attempt to regulate arbitration to require reporting of outcomes, compliance and 
enforcement are problematic.
47
  This is a DSD issue, because the system designers could 
provide for disclosure for purposes of monitoring and evaluation, a characteristic of 
robust institutions according to Ostrom’s IAD framework.  
Instead, most arbitration occurs under an agreement in which all parties agree to 
maintain the confidentiality of communications in the process and usually agree not to 
disclose its outcome. In adhesive arbitration clauses, confidentiality is imposed through a 
unilateral mandate possibly on an unwilling arbitration participant. Arbitration awards 
remain unpublished and confidential unless both parties agree to permit publication, 
which effectively gives employers or companies a veto over transparency.  Scholars have 
observed how confidentiality of settlements in dispute resolution can undermine 
enforcement of rights under public law.
48
 
In order to obtain access to arbitration data from third party providers who 
maintain case files, researchers must agree to respect that confidentiality, must develop 
data collection plans in collaboration with the source, and generally must report results 
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 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). For a critique of current U.S. Supreme 
Court arbitration jurisprudence, see Michelle L. Caton, Form over Fairness: How the Supreme Court’s 
Misreading of the Federal Arbitration Act Has Left Consumers in the Lurch, 21(2) GEO. MASON L. REV. 
497 (2014). 
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 Much of the discussion that follows is adapted from Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Evaluation Dispute 
Resolution Programs: Traps for the Unwary, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION 
SERIES PROCEEDINGS OF THE 59TH ANNUAL MEETING, 104 (2007); also see David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. 
Seeber, Ariel C. Avgar, & Rocco M. Scanza, Managing the Politics of Evaluation: Lessons from the 
Evaluation of ADR Programs, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ASSOCIATION SERIES 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 59TH ANNUAL MEETING 116 (2007). 
 
47
 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Jean R. Sternlight, & John C. Healey, Arbitration Data Disclosure in 
California: What We Have and What We Need. Paper presented at the American Bar Association Section of 
Dispute Resolution Conference in Los Angeles, April 2005 (copy on file with author). Data were 
incomplete, thus precluding systematic analysis of outcomes. 
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 Elizabeth Wilkins, Silent Workers, Disappearing Rights: Confidential Settlements and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 34 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. & LAB. L. 109 (2013). 
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only in aggregated form. Common methods researchers have used include mail and 
telephone surveys to organizations regarding their dispute resolution plans or the neutral 
arbitrators involved, mail and telephone surveys with participants, experimental research 
in which neutrals answer questions regarding a hypothetical case, and less commonly, 
examination of archival case files where available.  
These methods often present problems. Surveys may yield a low response rate 
because participants are reluctant to violate confidentiality or have no incentive to 
participate. There may be sample selection bias.  Selection bias means that the people 
choose to participate or not for some systematic reason; for example, people who 
comment at public meetings tend to be higher income, better educated, and not 
minorities. People who end up in the research or evaluation data samples may not 
comparable. Selection bias may occur when disputants have a choice of dispute 
resolution process, as in voluntary court-annexed programs that provide for mediation or 
nonbinding arbitration. Some disputants may prefer and self-select into a mediation DSD, 
while others choose small claims court; they may differ systematically. Moreover, under 
a mandatory adhesive arbitration DSD, all claims entailing a given corporation or 
organization must proceed to arbitration, unless the company waives it. Thus, it may be 
hard to compare that company’s arbitration cases to cases found in an administrative 
agency or court docket, as that corporation or organization may have systematic practices 
but its cases may not end up in court.  
Researchers rarely use random assignment, for example in nonbinding arbitration 
research on real cases in courts. If under the court’s rules, disputants would otherwise 
have a choice, and researchers exclude them from one dispute resolution option, the 
disputants might not perceive it as fair.  Therefore, a researcher may have samples of 
participants who use arbitration and others who do not, but these categories are not 
random.  It is rarely possible to use a pilot site/control site method to structure a study, as 
this requires a company’s consent, although this approach is certainly desirable in larger 
organizations.  In order to use a before and after design, the researcher must become 
involved with an organization early in its development of a dispute resolution program, 
and collect data over a prolonged period of time.   
Together, these problems operate to limit what researchers have learned about 
dispute resolution in general and arbitration DSDs in the private sector in particular. 
Public agencies and public sector employers are subject to freedom of information laws 
and may have more transparent systems.
49
 There may be a limited duty for private 
companies to disclose toxic spills or exposure of workers to chemical hazards. However, 
no such legal framework generally opens the records of the private sector to researchers. 
 
II. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURAL BIAS IN ADHESIVE ARBITRATION DSDS 
DSD refers to creating systems for preventing, managing, and resolving conflict 
through a sequence of steps or processes that ideally move from low cost to higher cost.  
In theory, system designers should first structure a system to address disputants’ interests 
(basic human needs stemming from security, economic wellbeing, belonging, 
                                                        
49
 E.g., for research on FINRA, see David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber, and J. R. Lamare, The Arbitration 
of Employment Disputes in the Securities Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, 65(1) DISP. 
RESOL. J. 54 (2010). 
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recognition, and autonomy) through processes like negotiation and mediation. In theory, 
if the disputants reach impasse, system designers should next approach the dispute 
through processes that assesses disputants’ legal or contractual rights, such as early 
neutral evaluation, fact-finding, advisory or binding arbitration, or litigation. Adhesive or 
mandatory arbitration DSDs generally do not follow this principle; they go straight to a 
binding, virtually unreviewable rights-based decision process. 
DSD is an important concept because it focuses not on the individual case, but on 
its context. The inquiry is not what happens in a given hearing, but what is the system 
design for handling the stream of cases? We need details on the structure of the DSD for 
each arbitration case. Instead, much of the literature on arbitration focuses on motions to 
compel arbitration, rules and procedures in the hearing room, principles in case decisions, 
efforts to seek judicial review of awards (usually unsuccessfully), and data on how very 
few awards are overturned.  
How do we solve the problem of structural bias in unilateral and adhesive or 
mandatory arbitration DSDs? Suggestions include judicial approaches to structural bias, 
legislative approaches to changing the FAA, and free market approaches to rating the 
fairness of arbitration programs. While all of these are creative and important 
suggestions, there is no evidence that any of these approaches has worked so far. 
 
A. Judicial Approaches to Structural Bias 
Structural bias has emerged as a constitutional issue in the history of procedural 
due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In the classic case 
Gibson v. Berryhill, Lee Optical Optometrists sued the Alabama Board of Optometry 
when the Board attempted to stop Lee optometrists from practicing.
50
 The Alabama 
legislature had repealed a statute that allowed companies like Lee to employ optometrists. 
The Alabama Board of Optometry was a state administrative agency that regulated and 
licensed all optometrists. The state optometry association filed a complaint with the 
Board seeking to revoke Lee’s employees’ optometry licenses. Half of all optometrists in 
Alabama were in private practice, and the other half worked for companies like Lee. All 
of the members of the Board of Optometry were in private practice. The Supreme Court 
held that this structure violated due process of law, because the Board’s members were 
biased in that they had a substantial pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. By 
eliminating their competition for half the state market for optometry services, they stood 
to benefit by perhaps doubling the demand for their services. The state’s structure for this 
public dispute system design yielded systemic structural bias that the Supreme Court 
struck down. 
This is a laudable case precedent, but it applies only where there is state action. It 
is inapplicable to private uses of adhesive or mandatory arbitration. The Supreme Court 
ruled 5:4 in AT&T v. Concepcion that under the FAA companies may impose arbitration 
clauses on consumers that bar access to class actions. We experience déjà vu as we face a 
line of Supreme Court case law on arbitration under the FAA. It is as if we have returned 
from 2014 to 1914. Corporate America’s freedom of contract, the old substantive due 
process of law U.S. Supreme Court creation, has risen again in the form of the FAA.
51
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The power of corporate America effectively to eviscerate public law on consumer 
protection and employment through adhesive arbitration has become a sacred corporate 
— almost constitutional — level right. 
Professor Nancy Welsh suggests that the SCOTUS is in effect creating a national 
small claims apparatus through arbitration. Professor Nancy Welsh has suggested a 
creative approach for the courts by looking to the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (“ERISA”).52 Using the ERISA by analogy and borrowing from the ERISA cases, 
particularly Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn (“MetLife”),53 she suggests courts 
might consider a fiduciary duty similar to the one employee benefit program 
administrators owe to beneficiaries.
54
 Courts could exercise appropriate supervision to 
control arbitration’s potential for structural bias by imposing a similar fiduciary duty on 
the designers and supervisors of company arbitration plans. She suggests that the 
Supreme Court may be able to maintain a deferential standard of judicial review for 
arbitral awards, while also considering the severity of structural bias in the adhesive or 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration context. She argues that if the severity of structural bias 
is named as a relevant factor for courts to consider, this opens the door for plaintiffs to 
demand discovery regarding all the indicators of structural bias.  She points to the impact 
of discovery in ERISA cases and potentially in mandatory pre-dispute arbitration cases
55
 
and shows that discovery is one way to transparency.
56
 Discovery could bring to light all 
the various design choices, or rules in Ostrom’s parlance, that have resulted in structural 
bias. 
This approach could reveal structural bias in individual companies’ arbitration 
programs. Over time, it could build a body of case law that identifies particular system 
design choices as unacceptable indicia of structural bias. However, this approach requires 
years in which we have individual litigants with substantial resources willing to take such 
cases all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The reason adhesive arbitration has become 
such a popular and effective means for corporate America to manage risk is that few 
people have the financial resources or the will to take on such a challenge. This is 
particularly true given the worsening inequality of wealth in the United States (yet 
another, and consistent, indicator fostering our sense of déjà vu, that we are back to the 
good old substantive due process days of social Darwinism). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
51
 Paul D. Carrington & Paul Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331 (1997). 
 
52
 Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural 
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 Id. at 220 (observing “Glenn now entitles claimants to request discovery regarding the details of insurers' 
and employers' claims handling.”). 
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B. Congress and Legislation: The Arbitration Fairness Act and Consumer 
Financial Protection Board 
 
 Congress could solve this problem if it chose to, with a president’s support, 
although this does not appear to be a priority for either the current Congress or current 
administration. Employers and manufacturers of consumer products can give themselves 
“get out of jail free” cards to escape liability under public law with adhesive or 
mandatory arbitration. It is precisely because the grounds for judicial review are already 
so limited, and because employees and consumers have few resources to pursue those 
grounds if acting alone, that companies can push the envelope to create skewed 
arbitration dispute system designs.  
 During the past twenty years, the major players in the field of arbitration have 
endeavored to use self-regulation to address abuses through voluntary protocols.
57
 These 
protocols speak expressly to various indicia of structural bias that would be rules in 
Ostrom’s parlance. The Due Process Protocol on the Mediation and Arbitration of 
Statutory Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship requires employees have 
the rights to counsel, limited reasonable discovery, participation in selection of the 
arbitrator, a reasoned decision, and other elements traditionally associated with 
procedural due process of law. Some courts have cited this protocol as persuasive 
authority on the fairness of an arbitration process.
58
 Moreover, there is evidence that 
when a third party provider enforces the Employment Protocol as to cases it administers, 
the pattern of arbitration outcomes changes in employees’ favor compared to a pre-
protocol case sample; in other words, self-regulation can make a difference.
59
 However, 
protocols are not law; their effectiveness is constrained by the willingness of parties 
voluntarily to comply. 
 The better solution is to abandon the laissez-faire approach
60
 embodied in the 
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Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence since Gilmer.61 Clearly, the Supreme Court is 
not going to do this, so Congress is going to have to do it for them. One tool is amending 
the FAA. The Arbitration Fairness Act has been introduced and reintroduced. The 110th 
Congress considered a variety of proposals to reverse through legislation the Supreme 
Court’s dramatic expansion of the FAA’s preemptive effect. The Arbitration Fairness Act 
of 2007
62
 would have amended the Federal Arbitration Act to provide:  
 
No pre-dispute arbitration agreement
63
 shall be valid or 
enforceable if it requires arbitration of— 
‘(1) an employment, 64  consumer, 65  or franchise 
dispute;
66
 or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
economic predators to contract out of the private system for law enforcement and “thereby exposing 
consumers, employees, small businesses, and other persons of limited economic bargaining power to a 
thousand wounds”). 
 
61.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24–26 (1991) (enforcing an arbitration clause in a 
Securities and Exchange Commission registration form for an employment dispute on the theory that it was 
a change in forum not substance and federal policy supports arbitration). 
 
62
 H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007). This bill contained findings including: 
 (1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the 
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial 
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power. 
(2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the 
meaning of the Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly 
disparate economic power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes. 
As a result, a large and rapidly growing number of corporations are requiring 
millions of consumers and employees to give up their right to have disputes 
resolved by a judge or jury, and instead submit their claims to binding 
arbitration. 
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether 
to submit their claims to arbitration. Few people realize, or understand the 
importance of the deliberately fine print that strips them of rights; and because 
entire industries are adopting these clauses, people increasingly have no choice 
but to accept them. They must often give up their rights as a condition of having 
a job, getting necessary medical care, buying a car, opening a bank account, 
getting a credit card, and the like. Often times, they are not even aware that they 
have given up their rights. 
Id. § 2(1)–(3). 
 
63
 The bill defined “pre-dispute arbitration agreement” to mean “any agreement to arbitrate disputes that 
had not yet arisen at the time of the making of the agreement.” Id. § 3(6). 
 
64
 The bill defined “employment dispute” as “a dispute between an employer and employee arising out of 
the relationship of employer and employee as defined by the Fair Labor Standards Act.” Id. 
 
65 The bill defined “consumer dispute” as “a dispute between a person other than an organization who seeks 
or acquires real or personal property, services, money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes 
and the seller or provider of such property, services, money, or credit.” Id. § 3(4). 
 
66
 The bill defined a “franchise dispute” as “a dispute between a franchisor and franchisee arising out of or 
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‘(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to 
protect civil rights or to regulate contracts or transactions 
between parties of unequal bargaining power.
67
  
 
 This legislative approach would have amended the FAA to carve out exceptions 
from its coverage. Advocates of mandatory arbitration insist that eliminating pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses would sound the death knell for any reasonably inexpensive and 
prompt access to justice for employment disputes, primarily because lawyers will not 
agree to arbitration on behalf of their clients after the fact.
68
 Legislative efforts to amend 
the FAA have met with stiff, and effective, resistance from the United States Chamber of 
Commerce. Senator Al Franken introduced a new version of the same bill, the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2013.
69
 With a deadlocked Congress, the likelihood of passage of 
arbitration legislation is slim; it is a topic so arcane to the average voter that for an 
elected official to support it would likely not affect their re-election chances. 
 Another alternative would be a statutory post-dispute opt out provision. Both 
parties could enter into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, but that agreement would 
specifically permit a party to opt out of arbitration once the dispute arises. The federal 
courts have substantial experience using “opt out” rules in their court-annexed ADR 
programs. Program evaluations conducted in collaboration with the Federal Judicial 
Center show a consistent pattern: participation rates in programs with an opt out clause 
are almost as high as participation rates in mandatory court ADR programs.
70
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
relating to contract or agreement by which 
 (A) a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, 
selling, or distributing goods or services under a marketing plan or system 
prescribed in substantial part by a franchisor; 
(B) the operation of the franchisee's business pursuant to such plan or system is 
substantially associated with the franchisor's trademark, service mark, trade 
name, logotype, advertising, or other commercial symbol designating the 
franchisor or its affiliate; and 
(C) the franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchise fee . . . . 
Id. § 3(5). 
 
67 
Id. § 4(4)(b). 
 
68
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arbitration). 
 
69
 S.878 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 (113th Congress 2013-2014), introduced in Senate (05/07/2013), 
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an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-
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 While there is no progress on the Arbitration Fairness Act, there is progress in the 
financial industry. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) was a product 
of the Dodd-Frank Act and efforts to regulate the financial industry after the 2008 
financial crisis.
71
 Dodd-Frank banned the use of mandatory arbitration in mortgage and 
home equity loan contracts.
72
 The CFPB adopted regulations to address banning 
mandatory arbitration clauses in mortgage documents.
73
 CFPB’s mission includes 
undertaking a study of the use of mandatory or adhesive arbitration in credit card and 
consumer debt agreements.
74
 It maintains a database of credit card agreements, some of 
which include arbitration clauses.
75
 In a recent CFPB study, the agency found significant 
growth in use of adhesive arbitration.
76
 Its research continues.  
Instead of a post-dispute opt out, however, in credit card agreements in the CFPB 
database, there is evidence of movement in the direction of a pre-dispute opt out in 
contracts for consumer financial products as the corporate response to potential CFPB 
regulatory action. For example, the American Express Gold Card arbitration clause 
provides, “You may reject the arbitration provision by sending us written notice within 
45 days after your first card purchase, or by February 15, 2013, whichever is later.”77 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(finding similar participation rates in three of the four voluntary courts with opt-out procedures to courts 
with mandatory referral); see also ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN 
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 6 (Federal Judicial Center 1996) (finding similar participation rates in 
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 For a more detailed analysis of its genesis, see Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013). 
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sec. 1414(a), ß 129C(e)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2151 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. ß 1639c(e)(1) (Supp. IV 
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 Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 12 CFR Part 1026, Loan Originator Compensation 
Requirements Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z); Final Rule FEDERAL REGISTER, VOL. 78, 
NO. 32, p. 11280, et seq. (Feb. 15, 2013). The relevant mortgage language appears in §1026.36(h). 
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75
 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Credit Card Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-
cards/agreements/ (last accessed June 21, 2014). 
 
76
 CFPB, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results To Date (Dec. 12, 2013) 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf (last accessed 
June 21, 2014) (on page 5, the report observes “[S]ection 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Congress instructs the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the 
“Bureau”) to study the use of pre-dispute arbitration contract provisions in connection with the offering or 
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represent only 17% of the contracts.  Id. at 22. 
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 American Express Gold Card Agreement effective June 30, 2013, CFPB Credit Card Agreement 
Database, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/agreements/ (last accessed June 21, 2014). The 
more detailed Right to Reject Arbitration provides: 
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Given that the vast majority of card holders will likely neither read this fine print nor 
exercise the option to reject arbitration if they do, this may be a very effective tool for 
preserving the value of an arbitration DSD for managing corporate risk of liability. 
In other words, given the current state of affairs, Congress is unlikely effectively 
to address the problem structural bias in adhesive or mandatory arbitration in the near 
future. 
 
C. The Presidency: An Executive Order? 
Where is President Franklin Roosevelt when we need him? In theory, President 
Obama could take a leadership position on mandatory arbitration.
78
 He could sign an 
executive order prohibiting federal agencies from doing business with companies that use 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses, as President Roosevelt signed an executive 
order prohibiting federal agencies from doing business with companies that engaged in 
race discrimination.
79
 The President is using executive order power to foster equal pay by 
prohibiting federal contractors from punishing employees for sharing salary 
information.
80
 So far, there has been no executive order on adhesive or mandatory 
arbitration.
81
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Your Right to Reject Arbitration   You may reject this Arbitration provision by 
sending a written rejection notice to us at:  American Express, P.O. Box 981556, 
El Paso, TX 79908. Go to americanexpress.com/reject for a sample rejection 
notice. Your rejection notice must be mailed within 45 days after your first card 
purchase, or by December 19, 2012, whichever is later. Your rejection notice 
must state that you reject the Arbitration provision and include your name, 
address, Account number and personal signature. No one else may sign the 
rejection notice. If your rejection notice complies with these requirements, this 
Arbitration provision and any other arbitration provisions in the cardmember 
agreements for any other currently open American Express accounts you have 
will not apply to you, except for Corporate Card accounts and any claims subject 
to pending litigation or arbitration at the  time you send your rejection notice. 
Rejection of this Arbitration provision will not affect your other rights or 
responsibilities under this Claims Resolution section or the Agreement.  
Rejecting this Arbitration provision will not affect your ability to use your card 
or any other benefit, product or service you may have with your Account.   
Continuation: This section will survive termination of your Account, voluntary 
payment of your Account balance, any legal proceeding to collect a debt, any 
bankruptcy and any sale of your Account  (in the case of a sale, its terms will 
apply to the buyer of your Account). If any portion of this Claims Resolution 
section, except as otherwise provided in the Limitations on Arbitration 
subsection, is deemed invalid or unenforceable, it will not invalidate the 
remaining portions of this Claims Resolution section. 
 
78
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D. Other Promising Scholarly Proposals 
Professor Thomas Stipanowich suggested a new analogue to the Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval in the form of an Arbitration Fairness Index.
82
 An 
independent entity using standards for measuring an arbitration DSD might rate it on 
fairness as a means to empower the market to address abuses. Professor Stipanowich 
suggests criteria for rating programs based on “each of twenty-three different program 
elements divided into five categories: (1) Meaningful Consent, Clarity, and 
Transparency; (2) Independent and Balanced Administration; (3) Quality and Suitability 
of Arbitrators; (4) Fair Hearings; and (5) Fair Outcomes.”83 Corporations that got the 
Arbitration Fairness Index seal of approval might find a market advantage among 
consumers and potential employees. Companies that received negative ratings might 
experience public pressure. Employees and consumers could make more informed 
choices. By providing an external forum for dialogue about these DSDs, we might break 
the judicial logjam. 
However, will corporations volunteer this information? Professor Stipanowich’s 
proposal requires that the rating agency receive substantial details about many elements 
of the arbitration DSD. These details are often absent from arbitration clauses in form 
applications or contracts. It is not until a case arises that the employee or consumer 
experiences the full details of a procedure. The proposal is a means for collective action, 
but the question is whether consumers have the requisite information for the rating board. 
 
III. CONCLUSION: TRANSPARENCY TO REVEAL STRUCTURAL BIAS IN ARBITRATION 
DSDS 
 
How do we get sufficient detail on arbitration DSDs to expose structural bias? We 
have Professor Welsh’s proposal for a creative new use of discovery, Professor 
Stipanowich’s proposal for an Arbitration Fairness Index administered by a third party, 
and the CFPB database and ongoing research. All of these strategies turn to transparency 
as a means to regulate corporate abuses in their unilateral design and imposition of 
structurally biased arbitration DSDs.  
History teaches us that disclosure can be more effective than direct regulation in 
certain contexts. At different points in history, events prompted Congress to modify how 
it controls administrative agencies. Executive branch agencies must comply with the 
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Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 84  Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 85 
Government in the Sunshine Act,
86
 and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), 
all of which use transparency as a check on abuse of power.
87
 History shows the APA 
fostered agency accountability by providing both transparency and participation in 
rulemaking; in effect, it limited the closed-room collaboration the Supreme Court rejected 
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (the famous and beloved Sick Chicken 
Case).
88
 
Disclosure was an effective regulatory tool in consumer finance; some argued 
disclosure in consumer credit for mortgages and loans was more effective than usury 
laws. Disclosure is a tool California used when it mandated third party disclosure of case 
outcomes in arbitration as a way to address the asymmetry of information about repeat 
player success in adhesive or mandatory arbitration. Employees may have the right to 
collective action even absent a union under labor law; perhaps a poster from the National 
Labor Relations Board (although its efforts to adopt regulations requiring posters have 
not been so effective of late). 
Transparency can be a powerful tool for controlling the abuse of power.
89
 With 
the evolution of government to governance has come a renewed emphasis on 
transparency and accountability to the public. Professors Archon Fung, Mary Graham, 
and David Weil examined targeted transparency as a policy tool in a variety of 
substantive areas, including financial disclosure, hazardous materials at the workplace, 
toxic substance releases, nutrition labeling, plant closures, hospital mistakes, restaurant 
hygiene, sex offender registries, and mortgage lending. In a clear and concise reframing 
of the literature, the authors provide models for understanding, assessing, designing, and 
improving the use of disclosure in as a policy tool. By envisioning the future of 
disclosure as decentralized, information technology-driven, dynamic and interactive 
“collaborative transparency,” they advanced the field. 
 The authors defined targeted transparency as having five essential characteristics: 
“[1] mandated public disclosure [2] by corporations or other private or public 
organizations [3] of standardized, comparable, and disaggregated information [4] 
regarding specific products or practices [5] to further a defined public purpose.”90 In their 
vision, there are specified disclosers, a defined scope and information structure, and an 
enforcement mechanism. The authors describe the evolution of targeted transparency as 
‘the third way’ in regulation; the first two are prescribed standards enforced by 
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inspections and penalties and economic incentives or disincentives to encourage the 
desired behavior. They persuasively argue that targeted transparency is not simply a 
subcategory of economic incentives, but rather a substantively different way to structure 
policy that relies on decentralized, bottom up action rather than centralized, top down 
enforcement. If structured well, these policies work effectively through a dynamic in 
which information users understand the new
91
 disclosures and use the information to 
make better choices; disclosers in turn observe the changed choices and respond by 
improving their practices or products in a way that fosters the intended public policy goal 
by reducing risks or improving services. The clearest and most entertaining example is 
the Los Angeles restaurant hygiene ordinance, through which inspectors give restaurants 
a letter grade of A, B, or C that they must post visible to customers on the sidewalk. 
Studies have shown that consumer response has reduced food-related hospitalizations and 
cause an improvement in restaurant cleanliness standards.  
Are there other means to achieve transparency? One possibility that may deserve 
more exploration is the wisdom of the crowd, perhaps stimulated by the strategically 
timely whistleblower. The action of a single federal contractor, whistleblower Edward 
Snowden, revealed massive surveillance of all residents of the United States through the 
use of telephony, text, and email electronic records collected by the National Security 
Agency
92
 on a scale never before seen in U.S. history.
93
 This has prompted Congress to 
conduct extensive public hearings and a spate of litigation on the question of whether the 
current administration has engaged in a wholesale violation of American’s constitutional 
rights.
94
 But for the disclosure by one whistleblower, there would likely have been no 
transparency volunteered by the administration or the National Security Administration 
regarding these activities. As a result of this disclosure, the wisdom of the crowd grows 
through public sharing of information in the media and on the Internet.
95
 
Perhaps a more benign example of the wisdom of the crowd is Galaxy Zoo, an 
experiment to see if people around the world on the internet would help a handful of 
scientists figure out what kind of galaxies they were looking at on satellite images. The 
result was a crowd-sourced evaluation and effort to classify all the photographed galaxies 
of the universe.
96
 Galaxy Zoo is considered a good example of how systems can emerge 
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through spontaneous collaborative human interaction in the tradition of the Ostrom and 
Indiana School IAD framework.
97
 Galaxy Zoo worked because it gave people recognition 
for their help. Parents and children acting as amateur astronomers stared into images of 
the night sky. They received credit on publications by the scientists. The incentives were 
sufficient to elicit the help of thousands of people. 
What would it take to crowd source information about the details of adhesive or 
mandatory arbitration plans? Unlike Galaxy Zoo, this would ask people to volunteer 
information that, once people find themselves in the midst of an arbitration case, may be 
‘classified’ (pun intended) as confidential by their employers or companies that sold 
goods or services. Like Galaxy Zoo trained people online to classify galaxies, could a 
website train people up on how to look for rules or steps or elements that indicate 
structural bias in the arbitration plan they find themselves subject to? Could it provide 
incentives for people to help classify arbitration DSDs? And if these incentives were 
sufficient, could this provide a mechanism for teaching employees and consumers how to 
make more informed choices? 
Customers’ online reviews have proven useful for sellers like Amazon, or so 
dangerous to a company’s reputation, that companies must monitor the web to clean up 
their reputation.
98
 Could we build a website that provided for customer reviews of 
company arbitration plans? This could provide indicia of arbitration fairness, but unlike 
the Arbitration Fairness Index proposed by Professor Stipanowich, it would not be a 
recognized ranking by an authoritative third party like Good Housekeeping or Consumer 
Reports; it would be crowd-sourced and the cumulative product of many people’s 
perceptions and experiences. It would be a means for collective action now that the 
Supreme Court has authorized companies to limit class actions in arbitration DSDs. 
This approach requires civic-hacking.
99
 It requires people to develop a website 
using open source code and make it available to the rest of us for free. It requires some 
truly creative person to come up with an incentive that will make others want to share 
what they know on the inside about how a given arbitration program truly works, in 
detail. It may be easier to create this for consumer products than it is for employment 
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arbitration, because it is closer to what consumers are accustomed to do when they rate 
products in reviews. There are a number of websites for rating your employer or boss.
100
 
What would it take to give people a useful tool for rating their employer’s dispute 
resolution process in a way that might produce usable evidence in litigation?  
 In sum, what if we were able to use targeted disclosure as a means to address the 
abuses and structural bias in adhesive or mandatory arbitration programs? Perhaps we 
could boldly go where no Congress, President, or Court has gone before. 
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